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The EU and gender equality: Better off in, or out? Questions of inequality, gender and 
im/migration.  
It is results day for the UK Referendum on membership of the European Union and I am on 
my way to Bucharest to give a talk on inequalities in contemporary Europe. Waiting to board 
the flight I catch fragments of speeches sprinkled with words like ‘inclusive’, ‘tolerant’, 
‘generous’, ‘progressive’ and ‘European’. Condescending, as they are spoken by the Brexit 
champions. Alarming, as I follow a growing number of reports from across the UK of racism 
and threats aimed at migrants and non-migrants alike. Whilst it is possible to make sense of 
Brexit as an expression of growing socio-economic inequality, the sexism and racism that has 
been unleashed is not so easily understood.  
A conversation I had with a builder renovating the flat I moved into when I arrived in the UK 
almost a decade ago shows how complex issues of the economy, social policy, and migration 
play out on a daily basis.  Asked why there weren’t any sockets in the bathroom, he 
responded that ‘it is because of Brussels’ and ‘all these regulations from the EU’. We went on 
to talk about the Polish plumbers that the builder employed: their skills, work ethic, and 
wages.  The connection between EU red tape and sockets did not persuade - I was, after all, 
able to use a hairdryer in even in the bathrooms in Brussels. However, the links between 
labour mobility, skills and wages and their impact on livelihoods did illuminate how 
interdependent life across the EU has become.   
Research with men on the relationship between gender, migration and domestic worki shows 
the way migrants negotiate the multiple processes involved in the pursuit of life projects via 
migration. For instance, Fryderyk, a Polish handyman, said: ‘I planned to go to Holland, but 
the Dutch parliament didn’t allow Polish people to work legally there. I could open a 
business, but my wife couldn’t work legally so she would have, I don’t know, quite a bad job 
cleaning or something like that, and she didn’t want to do this because she’s a teacher’.   
These experiences suggest that commonplace convictions that the EU is responsible for that 
which is negative, inconvenient, or difficult to explain circulate alongside - less frequently -  
recognition of the privileges and opportunities that come from membership in the EU. They 
also show that macro-level economic, social and migration processes play out at the 
interpersonal level of everyday life. Finally, they reveal that gender, while under examined, is 
integral to all these dimensions and debates. 
 
The economic, social and migration nexus 
Throughout Europe migration, asylum and refugee policies are amongst the most heated 
political issues.  The regulatory framework of the EU divides and categorises people into EU 
citizens and third country nationals, ranging from those with opportunities to engage in work 
or study to those who are forced to seek asylum for fear of persecution. These stratifications 
are deeply gendered. 
Although the category ‘women and children’ comprise 85-90 per cent of the world’s 
refugees,  adult men make up 90 per cent of asylum applicationsii. Disproportionately 
affecting women, national regulations permit breadwinners to bring dependants but 
dependant wives face barriers to employment, lack of recognition of their qualifications and 
deskilling. In the UK, the labour force participation of foreign-born women lags behind that 
of both native-born women and foreign-born meniii.  
There are clear problems with the EU treatment of migration but the introduction of a number 
of initiatives promoting family reunification rights, granting equal protection in social 
security to permanent third-country nationals, recognising qualifications and prohibiting 
discrimination have been taking us in the right direction. These initiatives provide minimum 
protection floors and encourage coordinating and voluntary measures, leaving member states 
with considerable autonomy.  
The EU record on gender equality, which mainly addresses women in employment, warrants 
a similarly considered verdict. Although women are a heterogeneous group with a wide range 
of priorities, it is possible to identify the benefits of EU membership to women across the 
spectrum in the areas of labour protection and enhanced social welfare. These include rights 
for part-time workers, working time regulations with limits on maximum working hours and 
provisions for break periods and paid leave, regulations and judgments on equal pay, 
childcare targets, and maternity and parental leave. Complementing these established 
initiatives are actions on pensions, political representation, and gender based violence.  
Again, these policies leave much to be desired, but the UK is not just a passive recipient. The 
process surrounding the Pregnant Workers Directive provides a telling example. In 2008 the 
European Commission proposed raising the minimum number of weeks of maternity leave 
from 14 to 18 and endorsing the principle of full pay.  The European Parliament amended the 
proposal to 20 weeks paid maternity and 2 weeks paid paternity leaves. This was blocked by 
member state governments – notably by the UK and its business lobby. After a stalemate of 7 
years the Directive was withdrawn. This illustration speaks to the kind of power the UK 
holds within the EU, and stands in contrast to control over migration.  
The total annual net migration to the UK is running at over 300,000, exceeding the 
government’s target of under 100,000. Estimates for 2014 show that 13% of people who 
migrated to the UK were British nationals, 42% were nationals of other EU countries, and 
45% were nationals of non-EU countries. The number of British migrants living in other EU 
countries is estimated at 1.2 million, whereas around 3 million of EU migrants live in the UK. 
What explains migration to the UK? The skill and labour shortages across the UK economy 
in the 1990s led to growth in labour migration, both into feminised sectors (education, health, 
retail and hospitality) as well as sectors dominated by men (ICT, business and finance)iv. 
Labour market flexibility and the relative ease of hiring and firing sustain this process. These 
pull factors ‘importing’ workers run alongside push dynamics as people move from countries 
with lower productivity and wages. The 2004 EU enlargement made this particularly evident.  
Empirical analyses show that EU immigrants pay more in taxes than they withdraw in 
benefits and public servicesv and that it is the financial crisis, rather than immigration, that 
has negatively impacted services, housing, jobs and wagesvi.  Nevertheless, the positive 
contributions of immigrants cannot be the sole factor in shaping the decisions on migration. 
The perspectives of migrants vary, but are likely to challenge the construction of migrants 
merely as individual units of labour. A woman (often a mother) from Poland or Romania 
caring for the elderly in Germany or Italy depends on the transnational care she provides for 
income.  Paradoxically, to meet her responsibilities of securing material resources for herself 
and her family, she is unable to provide care for her own childrenvii. These tensions between 
breadwinning and caring obligations become individualised in public discourses concerning 
parental migration. Adam, a migrant handyman, reflected how in Poland ‘At that time when 
parents left the country they were rubbish because they left the child’.  And when asked if 
they would go back if earnings were better in Poland, many shared Wojtek’s view: ‘I would 
go back without any hesitation’ viii. 
The personal cost of migration also entails loss of support networks, downward occupational 
mobility, and exploitation. Filip reflected on the impact on fathering: ‘You come from work 
tired and there are other things to do and you have to dedicate your free time to the child and 
you don’t always have that time. I would like to have time to do what I do with the boss’s 
children. Whatever my son would like to do, whether he wants to play football or guitar or go 
swimming’ix.   
These are the experiences of the relatively privileged migrants in the UK. The ability to 
realise work and care aspirations is much more insecure for those without the right to entry, 
residence, labour market access and social entitlementsx. For Said work was important, but 
difficult to arrange ‘No passport? Out. Very easy, believe me.  I’ve got now maybe fifteen, 
sixteen different payslips… everything changed, law changed, especially after the East 
Europeans have come’.  The physical separation from his son for more than seven years was 
difficult to bridge with only telephone and internet contact: ‘When I was there, he was just a 
little boy [we had] a very strong relationship, normal for a father and a son, it was lovely 
(…) but [now] he’s not happy, I’d like to bring him here‘.  
The contradictions become even sharper when migrant women and men take on the caring 
and social reproductive work which enables those with high-incomes to maintain their jobs 
and realise their caring obligations. Take for example Richard, a British dad, justifying the 
outsourcing of domestic tasks to handymen: ‘The primary reason that we do this is because I 
work very hard, very long hours, I’m away a lot. And when it comes to family time, we want 
family quality time. So this is a way of making sure than when I am there I’ve got time for 
[the children] rather than running around changing light bulbs and cutting the grass’. This 
resonates with Ted, for whom: ‘It was really a judgment; my time is limited and I can earn 
£4000 a day doing my job, so I need to pay other people to do stuff which costs less than 
that’.  And so inequalities are transferred from one group to another, rather than transformed.  
Given the income gaps between the UK and other world regions the migration push is likely 
to persist. These economic inequalities are exacerbated by a string of military interventions in 
the Middle East, the geopolitics of falling oil prices in sub-Saharan Africa, and crises like the 
Syrian civil war. An ethical response to the extraordinary situation of the recent large-scale 
inflows of refugees into Europe is already proving difficult. Migration management only in 
response to fluctuating market needs is an untenable strategy for the UK, or any state.  
Uncoupling the EU-migration debate 
Migration, whether from within or without EU borders, is neither a problem nor a solution. It 
is a process driven by multiple factors, captures a wide range of experiences, and caries costs 
and opportunities for individuals and societies alike. Undoubtedly, the EU has brought 
benefits to women and men variously positioned as migrants, workers, and carers, as well as 
to the UK economy. On these – as well as other – issues, the UK has definitely been better 
off in. Tying migration to EU membership, as the leave campaign did, denigrated the EU 
without demonstrating interest in a fair and safe immigration system. It also insulted those, 
migrant or not, concerned with rampant inequality, income and job insecurity, inadequate and 
unaffordable housing, under resourced health and social care systems, to name a few.  
And so, given the current state of inequalities across the globe, migration, to paraphrase 
Gayatri Spivak, is ‘that which we cannot not want’xi. Not because of the contributions of 
migrants to the UK economy and society; not because of migrants’ own life projects; and not 
because migration is or isn’t the answer to inequality. Migration reveals the workings of 
uneven development and makes the case for the need to address them.  
Should the United Kingdom have remained a member of the European Union? The 
Referendum campaigns fused migration with EU membership, as if either remaining or 
leaving could have adequately resolved it. However, it is not just that the ‘the question of 
migration’ cannot be contained within ‘the question of Europe’; it is that the UK needs to 
confront both of these questions independently and in connection with each other. Britain 
must face this by working out what it really means to be ‘inclusive’, ‘tolerant’, ‘generous’, 
‘progressive’ and ‘European’. 
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